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THE MCREYNOLDS MYSTERY SOLVEDt

LOUISE WEINBERGtt
Justice McReynolds' authorship of the celebrated case of Meyer v.
Nebraska seems puzzling in view of McReynolds' known
predilections. Developments in the law and revelations offact cast a
long shadow back upon Meyer, and McReynolds' positions in other
cases support the conclusion that we have a plausiblesolution to the
mystery of McReynolds' authorshipof Meyer.
INTRODUCTION

Ordinary mortals may not have heard of the case of Meyer v.
Nebraska,' but in American law schools, Meyer, a 1923 case in the
Supreme Court, is mentioned reverently as a great fount of constitutional
rights. It is the first modem civil rights case.2 True, Meyer has been
deplored as the source of a regrettable jurisprudence of open-ended,
unanchored rights under the oxymoronic rubric of "substantive due
process." 3 The Supreme Court itself seems to approach substantive due
process with reluctance.4 A lecturer might mention Meyer with a certain

tCopyright 0 2012 by Louise Weinberg. I would like to acknowledge with gratitude and
appreciation the particular excellence of the Editor in Chief of this law review, Matthew Arentsen.
ftHolder of the Bates Chair and Professor of Law, University of Texas School of Law.
1. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
2. See, e.g., Kenneth L. Karst, The Liberties of Equal Citizens: Groups and the Due Process
Clause, 55 UCLA L. REV. 99, 109 (2007) (tracing to Meyer v. Nebraska modem civil rights
protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment); David E. Bernstein, Lochner v.
New York: A CentennialRetrospective, 83 WASH. U. L. Q. 1469, 1509 (2005) (finding that "[tihe
expansion of Lochnerian due process jurisprudence to civil liberties began with Meyer v. Nebraska .
. . ."); Paul Finkelman, German Victims and American Oppressors: The Cultural Background and
Legacy of Meyer v. Nebraska, in LAW AND THE GREAT PLAINS: ESSAYS ON THE LEGAL HISTORY OF

THE HEARTLAND 33, 33 (John R. Wunder ed., 1996) (viewing Meyer "as the most significant civil
liberties victory of the WWI period" and "the immediate prelude to the incorporation of the Bill of
Rights through the Fourteenth Amendment.").
3.

See, e.g., JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW

18 (1980); James W. Ely, Jr., The Oxymoron Reconsidered: Myth and Reality in the Origins of
Substantive Due Process, 16 CONST. COMM. 315 (1999).

4. See, e.g., Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992) (Stevens, J.) (stating
that "the Court has always been reluctant to expand the concept of substantive due process because
guideposts for responsible decisionmaking in this unchartered [sic] area are scarce and openended.").
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sophisticated irony, pointing out that Meyer was rooted in Lochner v.
New York,' a case as reviled as Meyer is admired.
None of these common responses to Meyer touch the riddle of the
case's authorship: How on earth could the notoriously illiberal Justice
James Clark McReynolds have written that liberal icon, Meyer v.
Nebraska? At some level of consciousness the question must still perplex
other toilers in the vineyard of constitutional law as it did me. It is no
answer to say that Meyer was an exuberance of McReynolds'
"Lochnerism." 6 Lochner was not a fount of rights, and Meyer was. Nor
can Meyer be explained as some inadvertence on McReynolds' part. Two
years after Meyer, McReynolds wrote the opinion for the Court in Pierce
v. Society of Sisters, an important reassertion of Meyer. Nor can we
conclude, in our satisfaction with Meyer, that we have somehow
exaggerated the Scrooge in McReynolds.8 It is not possible to exaggerate
the Scrooge in McReynolds. 9
No writer in constitutional law, as far as I can discover, has solved
this riddle. Although many must have experienced this cognitive
dissonance, few have troubled even to articulate it.10 This paper records
one writer's working-out of a solution to the McReynolds mystery. With
a deeper grasp of what was at stake in the case, we can see that Meyer
has a dark side, one that links it to Lochner, but one that cannot be
understood simply by fretting over Meyer's roots in Lochner.
Part I of this paper recalls Meyer in its 1923 context, as well as its
successor, Pierce v. Society of Sisters, and the celebratory light in which
both cases came to be perceived. Part II focuses on the difficulty, for
authorship of Meyer, that the character of Justice McReynolds presents.
Part III grapples with the specific issue confronting the Court in Meyer:
the persistent problem of the language of instruction in schools. Part IV
then turns to Wisconsin v. Yoder," decided a half century later - a

5. 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (striking down, under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, a state statute providing a maximum ten-hour day for bakers as violating the "liberty of
contract" of both worker and employer).
6. See, e.g., Kurt T. Lash, The Constitutional Convention of 1937: The Original Meaning of
the New Jurisprudential Deal, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 459, 492-96 (2001).
7. 268 U.S. 510 (1925). See also Farrington v. Tokushige, 273 U.S. 284, 199 (1927)
(McReynolds, J.) (striking down, under the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause, a local Hawaii
statute barring Japanese parents from enrolling their children in Japanese language schools).
8. See, e.g., Barry Cushman, The Secret Lives of the Four Horsemen, 83 VA. L. REV. 559, 560
(1997) (pointing out apparently anomalous liberal positions taken by Supreme Court Justices such as
McReynolds, now more usually remembered as consistently seeking to balk New Deal legislation).
9. The point is developed infra Parts 11and VI.
10. See, e.g., David P. Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court: 1921-1930, 1986 DUKE
L. J. 65, 143 (opaquely attributing McReynolds' "liberal" decision in Meyer to judicial activism);
Louise Weinberg, Fear and Federalism, 23 OHIo N.U. L. REV. 1295, 1334 (1997) (characterizing
McReynolds as the "improbable author" of Meyer).
11. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
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significantly similar case. Part V finds in Yoder and its aftermath a key to
the McReynolds mystery. Part VI then proposes and details a solution to
the mystery. The proffered solution builds on the facts in both cases, the
language and other features they share, the character of Justice
McReynolds, and the judicial positions taken by McReynolds.
Notwithstanding this paper's disturbing reinterpretation of Meyer, it
concludes with an appreciation of Meyer's legacy.
I. THE ROMANCE OF MEYER V. NEBRASKA

Meyer v. Nebraska has become even more illustrious today than it
was in the decades immediately following it. But the Justices who
decided Meyer would be astonished by the case's grand future as a
bedrock of constitutional thinking in our time. Among other things,
Meyer lies at the foundation of our modem constitutional rights of sexual
privacy,12 including the limited right to abortion first recognized in Roe
v. Wade.13 Meyer itself, however, was only about a teacher teaching
Bible stories in a private parochial school.
Meyer arose in a Nebraska courthouse, where Robert N. Meyer was
found guilty of the charge that "on May 25, 1920, while an instructor in
Zion Parochial School he unlawfully taught the subject of reading in the
German language to Raymond Parpart, a child of 10 years, who had not
attained and successfully passed the eighth grade,

biblical stories being used therefore [sic].,

. . .

a collection of

14

Meyer's little pupils were reading Luther's Bible in Luther's own
German - surely a fine thing. But a Nebraska statute enacted shortly
before Meyer's prosecution outlawed this. The statute prohibited the
teaching of a foreign language even in English, deferring any such study
to high school: "Languages, other than the English language, may be
taught as languages only after a pupil shall have attained and
successfully passed the eighth grade as evidenced by a certificate of
graduation issued by the county superintendent of the county in which
the child resides."15 Moreover, the statute specifically provided that "[n]o
person, individually or as a teacher, shall, in any private, denominational,
parochial or public school, teach any subject to any person in any
6
language [other] than the English language."'

12. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 563 (2003) (citing Meyer as the origin of
modem rights of sexual intimacy); Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000) (citing Meyer as the
origin of modem substantive due process rights of parental autonomy).
13. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
14. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 396-97.
15. Act of Apr. 9, 1919, ch. 249, §2, 1919 Neb. Laws 1019.
16. Id. § 1.
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Another section of the statute went so far as to attribute these
proscriptions to a state of emergency in Nebraska: "Whereas, an
emergency exists, this act shall be in force from and after its passage and
approval."' 7 Perhaps with this state of "emergency" in mind, Justice
McReynolds, writing for the Court, attributed the statute to
"[ulnfortunate experiences during the late war and aversion toward every
character of truculent adversaries."' 8 Indeed, in World War I, Americans
had so reviled anything German that they had even troubled to rename
sauerkraut "liberty cabbage" for the duration of the war.19 And now,
unsettled conditions in Germany following the war had produced a fresh
wave of German immigration, evidently stoking further xenophobia in
Nebraska.20
Justice McReynolds pointed out that the teacher surely had a right
to teach. "[T]he [Nebraska] Legislature," he observed, "has attempted
materially to interfere with the calling of modem language teachers." 21
Then, forgetting that in a prosecution of the teacher the rights of neither
the parents nor the children, strictly speaking, were at issue, McReynolds
added that the legislature had also interfered "with the opportunities of
pupils to acquire knowledge, and with the power of parents to control the
education of their own."22 None of this could be due process.23
Note this unemphatic ringing in of "the power of parents to
control." This is the faint improbable dawn of an articulated
constitutional realm of parental autonomy.24 In time, lawyers would
17. Id. § 4.
18. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 402. McReynolds here may have been referring not only to Germany,
but to the German-Americans who, before the War, sought to influence American policy in ways
favorable to Germany. See Reinhold Niebuhr, The Failure of German-Americanism, 118 THE
ATLANTIC MONTHLY 13, 13 (1916).
19. See, e.g., JAMES GEARY, I IS AN OTHER: THE SECRET LIFE OF METAPHOR AND How IT
SHAPES THE WAY WE SEE THE WORLD 120 (2011); TED WIDMER, ARK OF THE LIBERTIES: AMERICA
AND THE WORLD 180 (2008).

20. German immigration to the United States resumed after World War I in reaction to
uncontrolled inflation and growing street violence. For federal anti-immigration law at the time of
Meyer, see infra note 51 and accompanying text.
21. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 401 (holding, in language reminiscent of Lochner v. New York, 198
U.S. 45, 61 (1905), that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment secures a "liberty of
contract"). Interference with the right of the teacher to contract was an essential piece of reasoning
for the Meyer Court. Constitutional theories more relevant today to Meyer's facts were unavailable
in 1923. See infra notes 33, 34 and accompanying text.
22. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 401.
23. Id. at 399 ("The problem for our determination is whether the statute as construed and
applied unreasonably infringes the liberty guaranteed to the plaintiff in error by the Fourteenth
Amendment: 'No state ... shall deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due process of
law."').
24. This parental right also appears in Meyer in an accompanying laundry list: "While this
Court has not attempted to define with exactness the liberty thus guaranteed, the term has received
much consideration and some of the included things have been definitely stated. Without doubt, it
denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the individual to contract, to
engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a
home and bring up children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and
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come to see Meyer as grounding a regime of personal and family liberty,
including the privacy of sexual intimacy, even in matters with which the
Court at first had attempted to deal under some aspect of the Bill of
Rights.2 5 In time, Meyer's substantive due process would come to allow
women some freedom to decide whether or not to abort an early
pregnancy. 26 Meyer's most recent efflorescence is a constitutional right
to homosexual intimacy. 27 Something that only a half-century ago
compassionate doctors and liberal lawyers could argue was not a crime
to be punished but only an illness to be cured, is now understood to be
not an illness, but rather a part of a person's very being, the private
expression of which, between consenting adults, is a fundamental
constitutional right.28
More broadly, Meyer grounds the modem theory under which the
Constitution today, in its two provisions for due process29 substantively
protects fundamental human rights not specifically enumerated in the
Constitution.30 This, notwithstanding that "due process" strikes the ear as
having something to do with procedure.

generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit
of happiness by free men." Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399 (emphasis added). This sort of list is first
prominently encountered in Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546 (Washington, Circuit Justice, C.C.E.D.
Pa. 1823) (listing rights protected by the Privileges and Immunities Clause, U.S. CONsT. art. IV).
25. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (striking down as inconsistent with the
penumbras and emanations of the First and Fourth Amendments a state law prohibiting the use of
contraceptives, in a case involving a married couple); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1971)
(under the Equal Protection Clause, extending Griswold to unmarried couples); see also Stanley v.
Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969) (under the First Amendment, striking down law criminalizing the
possession of pornography, in a case in which the offense took place in the privacy of the home).
26. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (striking down a state prohibition ofabortion in the first
trimester of pregnancy; stating that the state could regulate in the interest of the health of the mother
in the second trimester, and the health of the fetus in the third); but see Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (approving, as not imposing "undue burdens" on the
right recognized in Roe, a statutory waiting period, a requirement of parental consent; and
requirements that the provider convey certain information to the patient seeking an abortion, and
report to authorities).
27. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (striking down, under the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment, a statute criminalizing sodomy), overruling Bowers v. Hardwick, 478
U.S. 186 (1986).
28. In a joint opinion by Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, the Court declared sexual
intimacy and procreation to be "matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices a person
may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and autonomy, . . . central to the liberty
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. At the heart of liberty is the right to define one's own
concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life." Casey, 505
U.S. at 851. Justice Scalia later dubbed this the "sweet-mystery-of-life" theory of constitutional
interpretation. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 588 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
29. U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV.
30. For the discovery of a fully elaborated theory of substantive due process as early as 1843,
protecting unenumerated rights acknowledged by the Ninth Amendment, see Louise Weinberg, An
Almost Archaeological Dig: Finding a Surprisingly Rich Early Theory of Substantive Due Process,
27 CONST. COMMENT. 163 (2010).
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Today a Supreme Court reluctant to endorse the concept of
"substantive due process" might decide Meyer as a free speech case,"1 or
a religious freedom case.32 But in 1923 the First Amendment's protection
of speech was not quite established in its relation to state government, 33
and the First Amendment obligation to protect religious freedoms was
not imposed on the states until many years later.34 Instead, Justice
McReynolds based Meyer on the right to transact. Citing Lochner v. New
York,'35 McReynolds found applicable a "liberty of contract"36
substantively protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. The first section of the Fourteenth Amendment provides,
among other things, that, "No State shall . . . deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . ." For decades the

Court had been working up an old idea that certain fundamental liberties,
like the freedom to transact -

the "liberty of contract" -

though not

explicit in the Bill of Rights, were nevertheless protected by the Due
Process Clause. 37

31. This was Justice Douglas's view, writing for the Court in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479, 482 (1965). See also Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969) (Marshall, J.) (striking
down, under the First Amendment, a statute criminalizing the private possession of pornography;
remarking that "also fundamental is the right to be free, except in very limited circumstances, from
unwanted governmental intrusions into one's privacy.").
32. The similar case of Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), discussed infra Parts IV, V,
was handled in this fashion.
33. See Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380, 387 (1927) (holding the First Amendment right to
freedom of speech applicable against a state).
34. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (holding the First Amendment Free Exercise
Clause applicable against a state); Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (same, with regard to
the First Amendment's Establishment Clause).
35. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 45.
36. Id. at 56.
37. See, notably, Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 593 (1897) (holding that the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects the right to transact with an out-of-state
insurance company), and cases there cited; a Westlaw search finds sixty-six other Supreme Court
cases predating Meyer and mentioning "liberty of contract" or "liberty to contract," and twenty-two
predating Lochner. Twenty-nine of the sixty-six precede a citation to the Fourteenth Amendment or
the Due Process Clause. The Supreme Court has come to adopt Justice Harlan's view, concurring in
Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961), that enumerated and unenumerated constitutional rights both
inhere in the fundamental due process right of liberty:
"[L]iberty" is not a series of isolated points pricked out in terms of the taking of property;
the freedom of speech, press, and religion; the right to keep and bear arms; the freedom
from unreasonable searches and seizures; and so on. It is a rational continuum which,
broadly speaking, includes a freedom from all substantial arbitrary impositions and
purposeless restraints.
id. at 543, and that sexual privacy cases are properly due process cases:
In my view, the proper constitutional inquiry in this case is whether this [anticontraception] statute infringes the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
because the enactment violates basic values "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty" . . .
. While the relevant inquiry may be aided by resort to one or more of the provisions of the
Bill of Rights, it is not dependent on them or any of their radiations. The Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment stands, in my opinion, on its own bottom.
Griswold, 381 U.S. at 500 (Harlan, J., concurring).
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In Meyer, Justice McReynolds buttressed his views of the rights of
teachers and parents to contract, and the right of parents to control the
upbringing of their children, with the strong point that there is something
repellent about forced uniformity in education. In a rather startling
excursus, McReynolds harked back to his classical education:
For the welfare of his Ideal Commonwealth, Plato suggested a law
which should provide: "That the wives of our guardians are to be
common, and their children are to be common, and no parent is to
know his own child, nor any child his parent.... The proper officers
will take the offspring of the good parents to the pen or fold, and
there they will deposit them with certain nurses who dwell in a
separate quarter; but the offspring of the inferior, or of the better
when they chance to be deformed, will be put away in some
38
mysterious, unknown place, as they should be."
The reader of McReynolds' opinion today, already sufficiently
stunned by the Nazi quality of Plato's ideas, hardly needs to read
McReynolds' conclusion:
Although such measures have been deliberately approved by men of
great genius their ideas touching the relation between individual and
state were wholly different from those upon which our institutions
rest; and it hardly will be affirmed that any Legislature could impose
such restrictions upon the people of a state without doing violence to
both letter and spirit of the Constitution. 39
Two years later, writing for the Court in Pierce v. Society of
40
Sisters, McReynolds returned to this theme of forced uniformity. Pierce
is an important case in itself, but it flows directly from Meyer. In Pierce,
the Court held that parents have a constitutional right to pull their
children out of public school and to educate them in private schools
instead, or, by extension, at home. Sustaining private schooling, the
Court held compulsory public schooling unconstitutional. McReynolds
did not impugn compulsory education, nor did he deny that the state
might impose educational standards on home schooling or on private
schools. But no family could be forced to send its children to public
schools.
Legal scholars, even those who do not habitually view every step as
a step forward, overwhelmingly perceive Pierce as an essential guarantee
of freedom. 4 1 And of course it is. Because of Pierce,no American child's

38. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 401-02 (1923) (elision in original).
39. Id.
40. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
41. See, e.g., WILLIAM M. GORDON ET AL., THE LAW OF HOMESCHOOLING 8 (1994), and
works there cited.
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mind need be stuffed with one narrow set of approved ideas. (Take that,
Plato!) Eighteen years later, in the Flag Salute Case,42 Justice Jackson
would memorably express the centrality in American constitutional
thought of this freedom from forced uniformity: "Ifthere is any fixed star
in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can
prescribe what shall be orthodox . . . .'*3
Liberty! On first reading Meyer, I imagined that, as McReynolds
read Meyer from the bench (if he did), the courtroom became flooded
with a radiant American light. But by indulging this romantic fantasy I
think I was unconsciously trying to suppress an inner doubt. Meyer was
all very well, but it was hard to see Justice McReynolds in a radiant
American light.
II. THE MCREYNOLDS MYSTERY
How could McReynolds have written Meyer? McReynolds is
accounted by commentators as among the least distinguished of Supreme
Court Justices." The commentators are being kind. What they mean is
that McReynolds was the most reactionary (not to mention bigoted and
mean-spirited) curmudgeon ever to serve on the Supreme Court.45
McReynolds is remembered as the longest-sitting of the "Four
Horsemen," a quartet of Supreme Court JusticeS46 who generally could
be counted on to vote to strike down progressive legislation. Their want
of deference to CongresS 47 was probably salutary in some respects in the
early days of the New Deal, when Congress and the Roosevelt
administration would unite with industry in a hopeful corporate statism.
The early New Deal effort was to control wages, to support prices, and,
most stunningly, to discourage competition. Congress would delegate to
42. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
43. Id. at 642.
44. See Albert P. Blaustein & Roy M. Mersky, Rating Supreme Court Justices, 58 A.B.A. J.
1183, 1183-87 (1972) (grading Supreme Court Justices from the best (Chief Justice John Marshall)
to the worst (James Clark McReynolds and Charles Whittaker)); Foreword,in JOHN KNOX, THE
FORGOTTEN MEMOIR OF JOHN KNOX: A YEAR IN THE LIFE OF A SUPREME COURT CLERK IN FDR's

WASHINGTON, at xx (Dennis J. Hutchinson & David J. Garrow eds., 2002).
45. See, e.g., Joel K. Goldstein, Choosing Justices: How Presidents Decide, 26 J. L. & POL.
425, 484 (2011) (referring to McReynolds as "a bigoted reactionary"); Michael J. Klarman, Social
Reform Litigation and Its Challenges:An Essay in Honor ofJustice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, 32 HARV.
J. L. & GENDER 251, 267 (2009) (referring to "the notorious racist and anti-Semite, Justice James
McReynolds"); David E. Bernstein & Ilya Somin, JudicialPower and Civil Rights Reconsidered,
114 YALE L. J. 591, 641 (2004) (describing McReynolds as "notoriously racist and anti-Semitic").
46. Justices Pierce Butler, James Clark McReynolds, George Sutherland, and Willis Van
Devanter. For a more complex evaluation, see Barry Cushman, The Secret Lives of the Four
Horsemen, 83 VA. L. REV. 559, 560-61 (1997) (discussing the occasional apparently "liberal"
opinions of the four).
47. See A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 541-42 (1935)
(striking down the National Industrial Recovery Act). The Schechter Poultry Court focused on the
minute regulation of sick chickens. Unfortunately the Schechter Poultry Court also struck down the
Act's provisions for maximum hours and a right to organize.
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private companies, in coordination with the new administrative agencies,
the task of developing intrusive and often unenforceable regulatory
codes.4 8 But the obstructionism of the surviving Horsemen persisted even
when voting on more sensible legislation, even after 1937, when the
balance of the Court had swung Roosevelt's way.49
McReynolds' role as one of the Four Horsemen is not the worst
aspect of his biography. Far from being well-disposed toward
immigrants, as one might imagine from a reading of Meyer v. Nebraska,
McReynolds, with a nativist's passion, loathed the greenhorn immigrants
crowding the slums of the big cities.o He was not alone in this. At the
time of Meyer, with the quota law of 1921,51 Congress had begun,
fatefully, to close "the golden door." Among the wretched "huddled
masses" 52 who made it to safety in America before the quotas hit were
millions of impoverished unassimilated Jewish refugees from Eastern
Europe, fleeing persecution. 3 And McReynolds was possessed by the
demon of anti-Semitism.5 4 McReynolds' anti-Semitism was notable even
in that day, when overt contempt of Jewry, humorous or rabid, infected
American society at all levels and disfigured American literature.
When Louis Brandeis, "the people's lawyer"' 6 having become the
first Jewish Justice, ventured to express a view at a conference of the
brethren, McReynolds would get up and leave.5 7 We do not have an

48. See JEFF SESHOL, SUPREME POWER: FRANKLIN ROOSEVELT VS. THE SUPREME COURT 56

(2011) (describing the codes industries purported to impose on themselves in an unprecedented
privatization of legislative power).
49. See, e.g., JAMES E. BOND, I DISSENT: THE LEGACY OF CHIEF JUSTICE JAMES CLARK

McREYNOLDS 103-10 (1992) (describing McReynolds' Supreme Court opinions from 1937 through
his retirement on February 1, 1941). McReynolds was the last of the Four Horsemen; Van Devanter
retired in 1937; Sutherland retired in 1938; Butler died in 1939.
50. When ruling against an immigrant, as he tended to do, McReynolds could seem particularly
harsh. See, e.g., United States v. Manzi, 276 U.S. 463, 467 (1928) (reversing a judgment, over strong
dissent, that had approved citizenship for an immigrant's widow); Chang Chan v. Nagle, 268 U.S.
346, 353 (1925) (declaring, in response to a certified question, that four wives of Chinese
immigrants were not entitled to entry); United States v. Ginsberg, 243 U.S. 472, 475 (1917)
(declaring, in response to a certified question, that an immigrant's certificate of citizenship must be
set aside).
51. Act of May 19, 1921, ch. 8, § 2(a), 42 Stat. 5, 5 (limiting the number of immigrants from
any nation to three percent of the number of foreign-bom residents of the same nationality listed in
the 1910 census) (repealed 1952); Act of May 26, 1924, ch. 190, § 4, 43 Stat. 153, 155 (repealed
1952).
52. These references, of course, are to Emma Lazarus's 1883 poem, "The New Colossus," a
portion of which is carved in the base of the Statue of Liberty.
53. See IRVING HOWE, WORLD OF OUR FATHERS, 20-36 (1976).

54. See Ruth Bader Ginsburg, From Benjamin to Brandeis to Breyer: Is There a Jewish Seat?,
41 BRANDEIS L. J. 229, 233 (2002).
55. See generally, e.g., LOUis HARAP, THE IMAGE OF THE JEW IN AMERICAN LITERATURE:
FROM EARLY REPUBLIC TO MASS IMMIGRATION (1974).
56. See, e.g., MELVIN UROFSKY, LOUIS D. BRANDEIS: A LIFE 201-27 (2009).
57. PHILIP J. COOPER, BATTLES ON THE BENCH: CONFLICT INSIDE THE SUPREME COURT 93-94

(1995); Ginsburg, supranote 54, at 233.
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official photograph of the Supreme Court for 1924 because that year
McReynolds refused to sit where protocol placed him, next to Brandeis.
For all McReynolds' apparent concern in Meyer v. Nebraska for
family rights, he showed no interest in acquiring a wife and family of his
own. He became the most alone of lone wolves, the most determined of
lifelong bachelors, the most sour of misogynists. If a rare woman dared
to argue a case before the Supreme Court, McReynolds would sigh, "I
see the female is here," and exit the courtroom. 59
It is not too fanciful to suppose that McReynolds, who had been
Woodrow Wilson's Attorney General, gained his nomination to the
supreme bench simply because Wilson could no longer tolerate the
curmudgeon in his cabinet and availed himself of the expedient of
kicking McReynolds upstairs. 60
How could this awful man have given us a great fount of rights like
Meyer v. Nebraska? Unable to solve this mystery, in an early article I
tried to paper it over. "McReynolds was a curmudgeon," I wrote, "but he
was an American curmudgeon." 6 ' A McReynolds apologist has written
that McReynolds loved children. But even this admirer acknowledges
McReynolds' misogyny. 62 Another McReynolds fan, a lifelong friend,
admits to an intention, in his memoir of the Justice, "frankly to omit

58. Ginsburg, supra note 54, at 233; see also ALEXANDER M. BICKEL & BENNO C. SCHMIDT,
JR., HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, THE JUDICIARY AND RESPONSIBLE
GOVERNMENT, 1910-1921, at 354 (2007) (1984). McReynolds maintained a consistent rudeness to
his later Jewish brethren, Justices Cardozo and Frankfurter.
59. BOND, supra note 49, at 10.
60. Accord PBS, Biography of the Robes: James Clarke McReynolds (Apr. 18, 2012),
http://www.pbs.org/wnet/supremecourt/personality/robes mcreynolds.html. This is not to say that
McReynolds' earlier service as Assistant Attorney General and then as Attorney General lacked
merit. McReynolds was a noted "trust-buster," prosecuting the great antitrust cases of his time. See
Tom C. Clark, Attorney General, Address at the Memorial Ceremonies for Justice McReynolds
before the Supreme Court of the United States (Mar. 31, 1948) (on file with author); see also
Michael A. Kahn, Note, The Politics of the Appointment Process: An Analysis of Why Learned Hand
Was Never Appointed to the Supreme Court, 25 STAN. L. REV. 251, 260-61 (1973) and literature
there cited. When Wilson nominated McReynolds to the Court McReynolds was perceived by
Wilson and others as a liberal. JOSEPHUS DANIELS, THE WILSON ERA: YEARS OF PEACE, 1910-1917,
at 540-49 (1944). Nor would I wish to diminish McReynolds' achievements as a Justice of the
Supreme Court, not only in Meyer and Pierce, but also in his contribution to the understanding of the
allocation of lawmaking power in admiralty in the major case of Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244
U.S. 205 (1917) - although Justice Brandeis, in effect, would supply the intellectual foundation for
Jensen some twenty years later in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). Jensen,
identifying national lawmaking power over maritime cases, is, in its own way, as mysterious as
Meyer. As one of the "Four Horsemen," McReynolds tended to disfavor national power. He
dissented, without opinion, in Carolene Products, United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S.
144, 155 (1938) (holding national economic regulation presumptively constitutional). But in making
national power in Jensen not only applicable but also preemptive, and by obscuring the difference
between seamen and harbor workers, McReynolds was able to strike a blow against state workers'
compensation laws, incidentally depriving Jensen's widow and children of nine dollars a week.
61. Weinberg, supra note 10, at 1335.
62. BOND, supra note 49, at 9-10.
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entirely those ill-tempered, personal criticisms that emanated from those
against whose views he stood adamant." 63
III. "ENGLISH ONLY"

Apart from the problem of Meyer's authorship, I was also beginning
to have problems with Meyer on its merits. I could not honestly say that I
agreed with it. The statute that the Court struck down in Meyer was
obviously what today we would call an "English-only" law, and Meyer
evokes our own interminable anguished controversy over how to teach
Spanish-speaking children in American schools (and whether it is racist
to want to teach them in English). There is a range of expert opinion on
these questions." I could not say with any confidence that I was right
about this; I could say only that I had an opinion.
Reinforced and advanced by Pierce,Meyer opened space in which
even American children, American citizens born here, could receive their
educations in the foreign tongue used by their parents at home, reading
foreign books, becoming steeped in foreign ideas. Most liberals see this
aspect of Meyer as a triumph of liberty. But it was not clear to me that
this liberty was doing the children any favors. I worried that these
children would become fixed in their parents' language and culture. How
could "freedom" from the usual American education in English advance
their prospects for success in this English-speaking country? - indeed,
in an English-speaking world? To spare Spanish-speaking children the
pain of early immersion in English, educators might be putting them at a
lifelong disadvantage. Nor could it much improve the fortunes of
Spanish-speaking children to teach them their English in their own
language. That would tend to make English the kind of "foreign
language" one learns from a book. This could be the trap laid for
Spanish-speaking children even in dual-language programs, in which all
children learn in both languages. I feared that in such programs the
children for whom English was the mother tongue would pick up
Spanish while continuing to think in English, while the children for
whom Spanish was the mother tongue, even as they picked up English,
would continue to think in Spanish.
Justice Holmes dissented from Meyer in a companion case,65 joined
by Justice Sutherland. Holmes wrote:

63. Stirling Price Gilbert, "James Clark McReynolds (1862-1946): Justice of the Supreme
Court of the United States of America" 3 (1946) (unpublished typescript) (on file with author).
64. See generally FRANcOIS GROSJEAN, BILINGUAL: LIFE AND REALITY (2010); LANGUAGE
LOYALTIES: A SOURCE BOOK ON THE OFFICIAL ENGLISH CONTROVERSY (James Crawford ed.,

1992) and authorities there cited.
65. Bartels v. Iowa, 262 U.S. 404,412-13 (1923) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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Youth is the time when familiarity with a language is established and
if there are sections in the State where a child would hear only Polish
or French or German spoken at home I am not prepared to say that it
is unreasonable to provide that in his early years he shall hear and
speak only English at school.66
It is possible to dislike and criticize Holmes but on this point I had to
agree with him. Holmes made a related argument about assimilation:
"We all agree, I take it," he wrote, "that it is desirable that all the citizens
of the United States should speak a common tongue, and therefore that
the end aimed at by the statute is a lawful and proper one." 68
Reading this again, I am reminded that to this day American public
schools typically do not teach modem foreign languages until their pupils
are too old to learn them. Like Nebraska in the Meyer case, many states
still postpone the study of modem foreign languages until the highschool years, at least in public schools. This delay means that we will
rarely be able to master the foreign language we choose. To be sure,
many can learn a foreign tongue even late in life. But it is the common
experience that many cannot. Our country is notorious for sending
American diplomats to places where they are unable to speak the local
language. It might be a reason for this apparent stupidity that we take
children from every corner of the globe and make Americans of them.
That is something we are good at, and will remain good at, and proud of,
as long as we do not allow a balkanizing multiculturalism to erode the
American ideal of the melting pot.
Of course McReynolds was right about the perils of a forced
conformity. But Holmes was right, too, about the importance, in a
society worthy of it, of assimilation.
IV. THE YODER IDYLL
A half-century after Meyer and Pierce, the Court decided a case
very like Meyer on its facts. Wisconsin v. Yoder6 9 concerned the way of
life of a community of strict Old Amish. Conservative Amish
communities tend to stop their children's education with grade school.
The children are not sent to high school. In Yoder, an Amish parent was
convicted of violating Wisconsin's compulsory school law, but the state

66.
67.
68.
69.

Id. at 4 12 .
See Louise Weinberg, Holmes' Failure, 96 MICH. L. REV. 691, 691-92 (1997).
Bartels, 262 U.S. at 412.
406 U.S. 205 (1972).
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supreme court reversed the conviction. Wisconsin sought review and the
Supreme Court granted certiorari.7 0
It was for religious reasons, Mr. Yoder argued, that the Amish
traditionally limit a child's education to grade school. 7 ' Their religion
forbids higher education because, in their view, higher education
corrupts children, making them worldly. High school sports make
children idle, taking time from their religious duties and vocational
training. In some localities, the Amish avoid the public schools even at
the grade school level, sending their children of all ages to their own oneroom schoolhouses.72 There, the children might be taught their reading,
writing, and arithmetic for a few hours a week, thus gaining a
rudimentary "English" education. (To the Amish, who often still speak a
variant of Pennsylvania Dutch, all persons and things outside the
community are "English.") The rest of the time, and in the years in which
other American children attend a secondary school, Amish children,
Yoder argued, learn the vocational skills they need to contribute to the
community's special way of life. 3
Chief Justice Burger explained that Amish girls were trained in care
of the household and Amish boys in care of the farm. This vocational
training of the Amish could scarcely be described as unsuccessful. The
Amish, Burger pointed out, were self-supporting, prosperous, and
peaceful. Theirs was an ideal community in which there were no crimes
and no welfare cases. The Amish had even obtained a waiver of the
obligation to pay social security taxes, since they did not need or want
social security. They looked after their own elderly.
Wisconsin, for its part, was hampered in defending its compulsory
school law by the fact that the Wisconsin legislature, in its wisdom,
required that its youngsters attend school only through the age of sixteen,
in many instances a requirement satisfied with only two years of
secondary schooling.74 If the state's interest in universal high school
education was as important as Wisconsin contended, why had the
legislature not required Wisconsin's young to complete high school? To
have done so might have inconvenienced Wisconsin's disappearing small
farm families, but it might also have helped to secure a more informed
and productive life for all Wisconsin's children. In view of the state's
apparent lack of concern about high school diplomas, another couple of
years of schooling for the Amish could hardly make a great difference to
70. Id. at 207. For much of the following background, see also Brief for Respondent,
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 1970 WL 116895 (1971) (summary of facts); State v. Yoder, 182 N.W.2d 539
(Wis. 1971) and literature there cited.
71. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 209.
72. Id. at 212.
73. Id. at 211.
74. Id. at 207 n.2.
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Wisconsin's educational interests. This consideration influenced the
three concurring Justices." Besides, as the Chief Justice pointed out, the
Amish were not as bizarre in their rejection of high school as might be
thought. Several states at the time did not require education beyond the
eighth grade. Mississippi had no compulsory education laws at all.76
Wisconsin insisted that Mr. Yoder had not been prosecuted for his
religious belief.77 The state acknowledged that religious belief could not
be punished. But Mr. Yoder's keeping his children out of high school
was conduct, which could be punished. Nevertheless Chief Justice
Burger did not doubt that the free exercise of religion was at stake in
Yoder.7 8 In the Amish's sincere religion, Chief Justice Burger thought,
belief could not be disentangled from conduct. The very essence of their
religion was submission to a prescribed way of life. Their religion
dictated every detail of their way of life - their language, their beards,
their concealing dresses, their covered wagons, and their farming.
Apparently charmed by the pastoral innocence of the scene the Amish
painted for him, Burger pointed out that from the very beginning, three
centuries before Yoder, the religion of the Amish had been all about a
return to biblical simplicity and unworldliness, and about staying close to
the land.79 In America the Amish had been faithful to these ideals for two
hundred years. Their religion was, in essence, a constant rejection of, and
struggle against, modernity.
The Chief Justice had to acknowledge that compulsory schooling
was originally, in part, a protection against child labor. But work on a
farm or in the home was healthful, he thought. There was no danger to
the child. 80 At all events, when a case so obviously fell under Meyer and
Pierce, and so clearly invoked both religious freedom and parental
freedom to control the upbringing of children, the prudent thing to do
was to apply the law, as far as it was possible to extrapolate it from
Meyer and Pierce.
The question was not whether Wisconsin's compulsory school law
was constitutional. Of course the state had power to encourage the
education of its workforce and its voters. As Yoder was argued, the
question, rather, was whether the First Amendment's protection of
religious freedom required Wisconsin to grant the Amish a religious
exemption from prosecution for violating the compulsory school law.

75.
76.
77.
78.
cases.
79.
80.

Id. at 237-38 (White, J., concurring).
Id. at 226 n.15 (majority opinion).
Id. at 229.
Id. at 215. For prudential and process reasons, this assumption characterizes Free Exercise
Id. at 210.
Id. at 228.
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The then-recent case of Sherbert v. Verner8' would seem to require as
much, in the absence of a showing of any compelling state interest to the
contrary.
But there was a snag. A Supreme Court case had gone the other
way. It was a less famous case, and an older case, but an important case
nonetheless. This was Prince v. Massachusetts.82 In Prince, a Jehovah's
Witness had been taking her child with her, out on street corners, to
preach and distribute religious pamphlets and collect money. The mother
had been warned at least twice by a school truancy officer that her child
must attend school. There was testimony that the child always begged the
mother to take her along with her; that the child thought it her religious
duty to go - paralleling the equally zealous testimony of a little girl in
Yoder.8 3 Nevertheless the Jehovah's Witness mother had been convicted
of violating the state's child labor law. The Supreme Court, splitting five
to four, sustainedthe conviction. Justice Rutledge, writing for the Court,
took into consideration not only the mother's but the child's right to
follow the dictates of faith. He considered also the parental right of
control shaped by Meyer and Pierce. But neither of these rights, in
Rutledge's view, was absolute:
Against these sacred private interests . . . stand the interests of society
to protect the welfare of children . . .. It is the interest of youth itself,

and of the whole community, that children be both safeguarded from
abuses and given opportunities for growth into free and independent
84
well-developed ... citizens.
A more direct contradiction of the Amish's position in Yoder could
hardly be imagined. Clearly in Prince the Court had identified education
as a "compelling state interest" - to use the Court's later formulation.
Thus, Princemet the test later laid down in Sherbert v. Verner, that only
on such a showing could a state deny a religious exemption from
otherwise applicable law. The Court in Sherbert had considered Prince,
however, and had confined it narrowly to situations in which the parents'
control of the upbringing of their children presents "some substantial
threat to public safety, peace or order." 85 Amish parental control did not
involve loitering on street corners and presented no such threat. The
81. 374 U.S. 398, 410 (1963) (holding that a state may not, absent a compelling state interest,
deny a religious exemption from restrictions on unemployment compensation), overruled by Emp't
Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990) (holding that there is no constitutionally required religious
exemption from neutral laws of general application).
82. 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
83. Id. at 162-63. But see THEODORE DREISER, AN AMERICAN TRAGEDY 1 (1925). At the start

of this fictionalized account of such a childhood, perhaps the author's own, a boy is made to go out
on the crowded streets with his fundamentalist family to sing hymns. Dreiser writes that the boy
"appeared to resent and even to suffer from the position in which he found himself."
84. Prince, 321 U.S. at 165.
85. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 403.
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Yoder Court held, affirming the reversal of Mr. Yoder's conviction, that
Wisconsin must allow the Amish a religious exemption from mandatory
secondary education for their children.86
Yoder goes considerably beyond Meyer and Pierce. Nothing in
Yoder suggests that alternative home schooling or private instruction
need meet state standards. Indeed, nothing in Yoder suggests that any
schooling at all need be provided for Amish children. This troubled
Justice White, concurring. White suspected that children who wanted to
move on and leave the Amish community would need high school
educations. But he thought additional skills could be picked up later in
life.87 Chief Justice Burger noted this concern, but he asserted that Amish
children did not leave their communities. There was no significant
attrition among the Amish.
Justice Douglas, dissenting, thought it unrealistic for the Court to
imagine that the Old Amish were living some bucolic idyll.88 Evidently
there were certain pathologies. There were reports of drinking and
rowdyism among the young. The teenagers were fixated on "filthy
stories."89 There was a high suicide rate. But Chief Justice Burger
pointed out that such behaviors occur among all young people. 90 Justice
Douglas also focused on the plight of under-educated youngsters who
might have wanted to do something ambitious with their lives. They
might have wanted to be pianists or astronauts or oceanographers. 91 At
the very least, Douglas argued, the children themselves needed to be
heard from. The testimony of one young girl, who swore that she had a
religious need to avoid high school, was hardly sufficient. The children's
lives would be stunted. But he did not suggest the appointment of a
guardian ad litem in cases in which the views of the parents might not be
in the best interests of the child.
Re-reading Meyer and Pierce and Yoder today, after 9/11, we might
well feel some previously unimaginable concerns. The overwhelming
majority of American Moslems of course are good citizens, well
educated and prosperous. We do not suppose that they invariably
sympathize with Islamist religious extremists. 9 2 But Meyer and Pierce
and Yoder clear a space, partly for religious reasons, partly in deference
to the right of parental control, in which American children would be
86. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 234.
87. Id. at 240 (White, J., concurring).
88. Id. at 244-45 (Douglas, J., dissenting in part).
89. Id. at 247 n.5.
90. Id. at 224 (majority opinion).
91. Id. at 244-45.
92. But see, e.g., George Michael, Steven Emerson: Combating Radical Islam, 17 MIDDLE E.
Q. 15 (2010), available at http://www.meforum.org/2578/steven-emerson-combating-radical-islam
(recounting a Moslem event in Oklahoma City, replete with hate speech and exhortations to
violence).
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able to receive an Islamic education, whether in a parochial school or at
home - in their parents' language, if desired, or in Koranic Arabic. All
this would be fully authorized by Meyer, Pierce, and Yoder. Islam is
most assuredly a sincere religion. However, as I understand it, it is also a
way of life,93 down to beards,94 various degrees of concealing female
dress, 95 hatred of others,96 barbaric penalties,97 and a rejection of
modernity98 - and, in some families, rejection of secular schooling. 99
Some Moslem schools may offer a substantially traditional Islamic
education,10 0 focused on recitation and memorization of the Koran, with
only enough other material, if any, to satisfy minimal state standards.
Some may inculcate Koranic and traditional elements of eliminationist
93. On this point and those following see generally IBN WARRAQ, WHY I AM NOT A MUSLIM
(1995); see also, e.g., Syed Abul A'ala Mawdudi, Islamic Way of Life, YOUNG MUSLIMS, http://web.
youngmuslims.ca/online library/books/islamic wayof life/index.htm (last visited Sept. 3, 2011)
(praising Islam as a way of living, a culture, and an encompassing political and legal system, among
other things).
94. Islam, ISLAMIC FAQ, http://www.islamicfaq.org/islam/index.html#Ql6 ("Muslims seek to
follow the noble example of the Prophet of Islam .... The Holy Prophet .. .had a beard and wore a
turban .... However, these were not done simply to follow custom or tradition.").
95. See, e.g., THE MUSLIM VEIL IN NORTH AMERICA: ISSUES AND DEBATES (Sajida Alvi,

Homa Hoodfar & Sheila McDonough eds., 2003).
96. The Koran is repetitively explicit about this, especially in the authoritative Medina shuras:
"So We planted amongst them enmity and hatred till the Day of Resurrection (when they discarded
Allih's Book, disobeyed Allah's Messengers and His Orders and transgressed beyond bounds in
Alldh's disobedience); and Alldh will inform them of what they used to do." (al-MA'idah 5:14); "It is
not for a Prophet that he should have prisoners of war (and free them with ransom) until he had
made a great slaughter (among his enemies) in the land." (al-Anfal 8:67); "Then when the Sacred
Months (the 1st, 7th, Ilth, and 12th months of the Isldmic calendar) have passed, then kill the
[idolators] wherever you find them, and capture them and besiege them, and lie in wait for them in
each and every ambush." (at-Taubah 9:5); "0 you who believe (in AllAh's Oneness and in His
Messenger Muhammad)! Verily, the Mushrikfn (polytheists, pagans, idolaters, disbelievers in the
Oneness of Allih, and in the Message of Muhammad) are Najasun (impure)." (at-Taubah 9:28).
Translationsof the Meanings of the Noble Qur'an, KING FAHD COMPLEX FOR THE PRINTING OF THE
HOLY QUR'AN, http://www.qurancomplex.com/Quran/Targama/Targama.asp (last visited Jan. 7,
2011) (An updated version of the Abdullah Y. Ali translation, revised and edited by a committee at
The Presidency of Islamic Researches, IFTA, Call and Guidance (in Madinah, Saudi Arabia)). There
are many other examples. See, e.g., SPENCE KEEGAN, ISLAM: RELIGION OF INTOLERANCE (2011).
See generally, BASSAM TIBI, THE CHALLENGE OF FUNDAMENTALISM: POLITICAL ISLAM AND THE

NEW WORLD DISORDER (2nd ed. 2002).
97. The

Cutting

of

Hands

and

Feet,

APOSTATES

OF

ISLAM

(2003),

at

http://www.apostatesofislam.com/media/handcutting.htm ('As to the thief, Male or female, cut off
his or her hands: a punishment by way of example, from Allah, for their crime: and Allah is Exalted
in power.' - Quran 5:38"). This is from the Medina revelations, later in the life of Mohammed and
thus authoritative because superseding anything to the contrary in the earlier (Mecca) revelations.
98. See, e.g., Khaled Ahmed, Why Muslims Reject Modernity, THE EXPRESS TRIBUNE (Aug.
15, 2010), availableat http://tribune.com.pk/story/39367/why-muslims-reject-modemity/.
99. See Conference on Islamic Education in North America (April 6, 2006), Woodrow Wilson
International Centerfor Scholars (estimating that there were then some 6,000,000 Moslems in the
United States; that there were at that time 235 Moslem schools, perhaps a fifth of them run by
mosques, with a total of some 65,000 pupils, or three percent of American Moslem children. Still
under debate in many of these schools in 2006 was whether to add secular studies to the traditional
curriculum of Islamic studies).
100. See On Islam & Newspapers, Islamic Schools of the Past Now the Present in America,
MUSLIMVILLAGE.COM (June 6, 2011), http://muslimvillage.com/2011/06/06/islamic-schools-of-thepast-now-the-present-in-america/.
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Jew-hatred'o' and violence.102 At most such schools, if girls are permitted
to attend, classes will be segregated by sex,1 0 3 and the girls required to
wear varying degrees of Islamic covering. Although we like to assume,
in our self-congratulatory way, that in America there is a right to wear
such covering, surely there must in any event be a right not to. But it is
hard to see how to protect little girls, should they be deemed
insufficiently shrouded, from bullying that will continue beyond the
schoolyard. Many of these girls are born in America, and are American
citizens. Yet throughout their lives they may be subject to traditional
subordinations and restrictions unimaginable to most other American
women and girls. 05 Moslem women to whom the state, with the best of
intentions, has permitted an Islamic education 0 6 may tend to raise their
own children in the same tradition.
Contrary to Meyer, Pierce, and Yoder, then, compulsory, secular,
co-educational schooling for both boys and girls might, perhaps,
contribute to greater freedom for American Moslem women. If we
indulge the presumption that such schooling could at least make some
Moslem women more broadly educated mothers, more willing and able
to help their sons and daughters realize and give of their talents, Meyer
and Pierce and Yoder would seem to stand as an impediment to progress.
Yoder was seriously undermined in 1990 by the case of Employment
Division v. Smith. 107 The Supreme Court perceived Smith, like Yoder, to
be a claim of religious exemption from otherwise applicable law.
Actually, Smith was about a worker denied unemployment
compensation. The worker, a Native American, had been fired "for
cause." Employed in a drug rehabilitation center, he had nevertheless

101.See generally MARK A. GABRIEL, ISLAM AND THE JEWS: THE UNFINISHED BATTLE (2003).

See also Translations of the Meanings of the Noble Qur an, supra note 96 ("[T]hose (Jews) who
incurred the Curse of Allah and His Wrath, and those of whom (some) He transformed into monkeys
and swines ..... (al-Mh'idah 5:60); "And kill them wherever you find them ..... (al-Baqarah
2:191)).
102.See Kenneth Adelman, U.S. Islamic Schools Teaching Homegrown Hate, CITIZENS FOR
PEACE AND TOLERANCE (Feb. 27, 2002), http://www.hatefreeamerica.com/islamic-school.html.
103. See, e.g., GEOGRAPHIES OF MUSLIM WOMEN: GENDER, RELIGION, AND SPACE 2 (Ghazi-

Walid Falah & Caroline Nagel eds., 2005).
104. THE MUSLIM VEIL IN NORTH AMERICA: ISSUES AND DEBATES, supra note 95.
105.See, e.g., PATRICIA ROBINETT, THE RAPE OF INNOCENCE: FEMALE GENITAL MUTILATION
AND CIRCUMCISION IN THE USA (2010) (2006); CASSANDRA, ESCAPE! FROM AN ARAB MARRIAGE:
HORROR STORIES OF WOMEN WHO FLED FROM ABUSIVE MUSLIM HUSBANDS (2006); Syed Kamran

Mirza, "Honor Killing" Is Absolutely Islamic!, ISLAM WATCH, http://www.islamwatch.org/SyedKamranMirza/honor-killing.htm (last updated Jan. 16, 2008); see also Murder in the
Family: Honor Killing in America (Fox News broadcast, September 5, 2008) (DVD on file with
author).
106. For an argument that the Constitution might have some application to the state's abdication
of educational responsibility in cases of fundamentalist home schooling, see Kimberly A. Yuracko,
Education Off the Grid: Constitutional Constraints on Homeschooling, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 123
(2008).
107.494 U.S. 872, 881-82 (1990).
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ingested peyote, a scheduled narcotic substance under state law. Native
Americans use peyote, however, not as a recreational drug, but in a
religious ritual. The worker claimed a religious exemption from the rule
denying him unemployment compensation. Justice Scalia, writing for the
Smith Court, took the plausible position that society cannot afford to
provide some people, however religious, with a special dispensation to
violate laws. 0 8 When a neutral law of general application incidentally
burdens religious conduct - inextricable as such conduct may be from
belief - the Free Exercise Clause does not require the state to grant a
religious exemption.
Nothing in Smith denies the state power to grant religious
exemptions if it wishes, short of establishing religion. To be sure, the
state would be treading a fine line.109 Yet most states traditionally have
provided religious exemptions in a variety of circumstances. In the past,
for example, "dry" states typically allowed the use of sacramental
wine."o Smith held only that the Constitution does not require the states
to grant religious exemptions from otherwise applicable law.' After
Smith, the Free Exercise Clause is reserved for cases of intentional,
targeted persecution. 112 It offers no protection against neutral laws of
general application.
This wisdom is not entirely new. An obligation to obey generally
applicable law had informed the Supreme Court's position all along."
The Court had first adopted this view over a century ago, in the first free
exercise case. Back then, Congress was the legislature for Utah because
Utah was a United States territory. In 1878, in Reynolds v. United
States,' 14 the Supreme Court held that nothing in the Constitution
compelled Congress to exempt the Mormons from anti-polygamy law.
To a modem reader it will surely appear that the anti-polygamy law for
Utah Territory was targeted at the Mormons. But the Court saw the
statute as neutral. After all, polygamy was universally regarded as
108. Id. at 888-89.
109. See, e.g., Tex. Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1 (1989) (striking down, under the
Establishment Clause, a tax exemption confined to religious publications).
110 See Michael W. McConnell, The Originsand HistoricalUnderstandingof Free Exercise of
Religion, 103 HARV. L. REv. 1409, 1419 (1990).
Ill. Congress had a hard time understanding why Smith could have been right. With the near
unanimity of both houses, Congress reacted to Smith by attempting to restore the law as it stood prior
to Smith. Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488, struck
down by City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). Congress came back with a narrower statute,
this time confining its scope to two particular subject matters. Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc (2006), sustainedin Cutter v. Wilkinson,
544 U.S. 709, 713 (2005).
112. See, e.g., Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 524
(1993) (striking down a local ordinance targeted at a particular religious sect).
113. The exception, according to Justice Scalia writing in Smith, was confined to a small group
of benefits cases. Smith. 494 U.S. at 883.
114.98 U.S. 145, 165 (1878).
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criminal in the United States. One wonders whether, today, Smith and
Reynolds, rather than Yoder, would govern the availability of a religious
exemption from anti-polygamy law, in a case, let us say, challenging the
conviction thereunder of an American husband of four wives and father
of twenty children - a devout Moslem immigrant, let us say, from
Pakistan or Saudi Arabia. Yoder is implied by Meyer v. Nebraska and
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, all three mandating religious exemptions
from law. But all three are in tension with Reynolds and Prince and
Smith, and their emphasis on the general duty of compliance with law.
Notwithstanding this tension, in Smith, Justice Scalia purported to
save Yoder and reconcile it with Smith. Yoder, he pointed out, was a
hybrid case, decided on two different grounds.' 15 Yoder dealt not only
with the Amish's free exercise rights, but also with the right of Amish
parents to control the rearing of their young. Smith does kill the
mandatory religious exemption part of Yoder, but it leaves intact Yoder's
parental control reasoning."l 6 Justice Scalia's attempt at saving the right
of parental control in hybrid cases, then, should have left Meyer v.
Nebraska, Pierce v. Society of Sisters, and Wisconsin v. Yoder still
beacons of liberty, at least for parents. Yet Justice Scalia's reasoning on
this point is more obfuscating than convincing. What stronger claim than
the religious claim could parents possibly muster to exempt them from
the force of reasonable state law protecting their children? The mere
assertion of a right of parental control could get a parent only so far, as
against reasonable state law protective of the child."'
V. THE DARK SIDE
At the time Yoder was decided, the Court's picture of the Amish
bore some reasonable resemblance to their lives. But the pace of Amish
compromise with modernity was picking up." 8 By the 1990s most
Amish communities permitted the use of electricity, provided it was not
obtained from a public utility but supplied by their own generators. Most
began to permit telephones, if only at business. Later, the Amish seem to
have decided that cell phones are permissible everywhere, perhaps
115.Smith, 494 U.S.

at 881.
116. Cf Yoder, 406 U.S. at 213 ("Providing public schools ranks at the very apex of the function
of a State. Yet even this paramount responsibility was, in Pierce, made to yield to the right of
parents to provide an equivalent education in a privately operated system."); Id. at 232-33 ("Under
the doctrine of Meyer v. Nebraska, we think it entirely plain that the Act of 1922 unreasonably
interferes with the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children
under their control." (quoting Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925)) (internal
quotation mark omitted)).
117. See, e.g., Prince, 321 U.S. at 162-63 (relying on state compulsory education law to protect
a child from the mother's use of the child in religious street activity).
118.See Lisa Biedrzycki, "Conformed to This World": A Challenge to the Continued
Justificationofthe Wisconsin v. Yoder Education Exception in a Changed Old Order Amish Society,
79 TEMP. L. REV. 249, 250 (2006).
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because wireless."' 9 A typical Amish community might frown on driving
cars, but permit riding in cars, hiring "English" drivers. 12 0 Covered
wagons are still retained, and poke bonnets and long dresses and long
beards as well - this sort of quaintness is what the tourists come for.
But there were deeper facts about the Amish, and another side to
Yoder even darker than the denial of educational opportunity to Amish
children. In 2003, the Amish in Pennsylvania lobbied their
representatives in Congress, with particular pressure on Senator Arlen
Specter,121 to grant them an exemption from the federal Fair Labor
Standards Act.122 They wanted an exemption from the provision in the
Act prohibiting child labor in certain circumstances.1 23 And they got their
exemption, in a 2004 amendment.124
Good grief! I thought. Is that what it was all about? I remembered
that business in Yoder about "vocational training" in the home and on the
farm. Yet the Amish surely did not need an exemption for agricultural or
domestic child labor. American children have traditionally been expected
to help out on the family farm. Today's urban schoolchildren struggle to
retain what they have learned during the year in their overlong summer
breaks, a vestige of this tradition. More importantly, the New Deal
Congress had excluded agricultural and domestic labor altogether from
federal fair labor standards. Perhaps this happened because Congress
could not imagine bestowing upon uneducated rural black workers - a
large contingent of the agricultural workforce in the 1930s - the same
pay and hours the Act would provide for more educated urban and
factory workers, who in those days were largely white. Perhaps domestic
workers were excluded in part for racial reasons, and in part because
Congress could not imagine bestowing upon women doing traditionally
unpaid women's work the same pay and hours the Act would provide for
men. Since the Fair Labor Standards Act did not cover agricultural
employment, you might suppose that the Amish would have had no
difficulty in employing child labor on their farms. The protections of

119.Howard Rheingold, Look Who's Talking, WIRED (Jan. 1999), available at
http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/7.01/amish.html.
120.See, e.g., FAQ: Frequent Amish Questions, THE AMISH OUTLAWS, http://www.
amishoutlaws.com/faq.html (last visited Sept. 25, 2011).
121. Steven Greenhouse, Foes of Idle Hands, Amish Seek an Exemption from a Child Labor
Law, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 18, 2003, at A9; see also, e.g., Ed Thomas, NY Amish Facing Child Labor
Law Pressure, CROSSWALK.COM (Dec. 15, 2006), http://www.crosswalk.com/1457683 (reporting
that Amish sawmills in New York State had been put on notice concerning violations of the child
labor laws); John Miller, Letter from a Former Amish Child Sawmill Worker to Congress, CHILD
2003), http://web.archive.org/web/20081030080744/http:/
(Oct. 21,
LABOR COALITION
www.stopchildlabor.org/amish/miller.htm (reporting personal experience of the danger and
strenuousness of children's work in the mills).
122.29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (2006).
123.29 U.S.C. §212 (2006).
124.29 U.S.C. §213(c)(7) (2006) (signed into law January 23, 2004).
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federal child labor law extend in the main only to "particularly
hazardous" occupations.12 5
It turns out that in the past quarter-century the world of the Amish
has undergone greater changes than those thus far mentioned. Recall that,
in Yoder, Chief Justice Burger mentioned a connection between
compulsory attendance laws, like the one challenged in Yoder, and the
problem of child labor. The Chief Justice reasoned that child labor was
not a problem among the Amish because work on family farms was
healthful.126 There was no danger to the children. But Burger could not
have predicted the recent growth of Amish furniture factories, and the
decline in Amish agriculture.
The Amish originally had been centered in Pennsylvania. But, over
time, with the natural increase in their numbers, and the arrival of tourist
motels and shops, the Amish found farmland in Pennsylvania too
expensive for their children to acquire enough of it, and offers from
developers too enticing to resist. The Amish were continually fanning
out to other states, ever seeking more and cheaper land, settling in
Wisconsin, Ohio, Indiana, Iowa. Ironically, wherever the Amish settled,
land prices would be driven up in part by their own demand, and in part
by developers anxious to cash in on the attractions the Amish held for
tourists. Some Amish communities were supporting themselves in the
tourist industry, working in Amish souvenir shops and Amish
restaurants, or as guides, or selling home-made jam and hand-sewn
quilts. There was considerable demand for wooden Amish knick-knacks,
hand-carved at first at home, and later made in small mills built on what
once was farm land.
In time, the Amish expanded from wooden knick-knacks into far
more profitable wood furniture, constructing it in their own factories,
using their own sawmills.12 7 They make civic furniture like gazebos and
park benches, as well as household furniture. The once rural landscape of
an Amish community is now dotted with noisy sawmills, where boys are
receiving "vocational training" - that is, they are working there.
This, then, was why the Amish needed an exemption from the law
against the exploitation of child labor in "particularly hazardous"
occupations. They were putting their children to work, all right, but not
on the farm. By 2003, most boys in an Amish community were working
in the community's furniture factories and sawmills. They had ceased to
be agricultural labor. Yet as one journalist observed, "Federal law has
long barred children under 18 from working in sawmills and
125.29 C.F.R. §§ 570.50-570.72 (2011).
126. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 229.
127.See WOODWEB, Some Perspectives on Amish Sawmill Operations (June 27, 2000),
http://www.woodweb.com/knowledge base/Amish mills.html.
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woodworking factories because they are so dangerous. The Amish have
upset opponents of child labor by pushing Congress for an exemption
based largely on religious grounds."1 28
Sawmills, indeed, are accounted among the most dangerous
workplaces. Chief Justice Burger's observation in Yoder, that Amish
was not dangerous or
agricultural work children's work have found Amish
Inspectors
irrelevant.
and
obsolete
unhealthful, is now
youngsters working full time alongside grown men, with heavy,
dangerous machinery, breathing unhealthy air filled with sawdust. Under
federal law all workers in sawmills and woodworking factories are
required to wear masks and protective gear, but the Amish children
suffer injuries and illnesses nevertheless.1 29
When making factory furniture became a way of life for many
Amish men and boys, some began to take on outside factory jobs as well,
usually in plants producing recreational vehicles - trailers. 130 Working
on trailers is approved because building "homes" is deemed acceptable
within the Amish tradition. But the current recession has seen massive
layoffs in RV factories. Amish men and boys have been returning to their
communities' sawmills and furniture factories, as well as to small-scale
agriculture.13 1 The faith that had deemed government support
unacceptable and inspired the Amish to obtain a waiver of social security
taxes has not prevented laid-off Amish factory workers from lining up
32
for unemployment benefits.'
The experience of the girls has been a little different. Beyond the
household chores to be performed mornings and evenings, they are kept
at quilt-making, or sent to sell souvenirs in the Amish shops, or to wait
table in tourist restaurants.
The Amish may not consider themselves to be exploiting their
children's labor. In their thinking, children must learn a trade. They may
see no difference between a field or a factory as a place in which children
earn their keep. They may see only a religious difference between
children worked all day to earn their keep and children permitted to have
128.CHARLES E. HURST & DAVID L. MCCONNELL, AN AMISH PARADOX: DIVERSITY AND
CHANGE IN THE WORLD'S LARGEST AMISH COMMUNITY (2010); Steven Greenhouse, For the

Amish, Tradition and the Law Collide: Wary of Idle Hands, the Amish Are Seeking an Exemption
from ChildLabor Laws for their Teenage Boys, N.Y. TIMES UPFRONT, Dec. 8, 2003.
129. See Miller, supranote 121.

130.See Marty Schladen, Amish Caught in RV Slump, J. GAZETTE (Mar. 22, 2009),
http://www.joumalgazette.net/apps/pbcs.dl/article?AID=/20090322/BlZ/303229948.
131.See Richard Mertens, Indiana'sAmish, Laid Offfrom RV Factories, Return to their Plows,
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR (May 26, 2009), http://www.csmonitor.com/Business/
2009/0526/indianas-amish-laid-off-from-rv-factories-return-to-their-plows; Laid Off Amish RV
Workers Return to Their Plows, RV BUSINESS, (May 28, 2009), http://www.rvbusiness.
com/2009/05/laid-off-amish-rv-workers-retum-to-their-plows/.
132.See RV Layoffs Cause Ethical Issue with the Amish, RV BUSINESS, (May 11, 2009),
http://www.rvbusiness.com/2009/05/rv-layoffs-cause -ethical-issue-with-the-amish/.
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a childhood of play and school. But they knew they were working their
children illegally when they persuaded Arlen Specter and others in 2003
to back the exemption they gained from the laws prohibiting child labor
in sawmills and woodworking factories.13 3
It is increasingly understood that these children have few options.
Some Amish, whether remaining within or departing from their
communities, have begun to write books about Amish life. 134 Although
some Amish authors praise the serenity of the lives they led or are
leading, others explain that the denial to them of an education when they
were young made it difficult for them to live outside the community.
Some charge that the children are kept uneducated for the very purpose
of binding them to the community. 3 1
Other facts have been coming to light as well. The strongest
measure of the community's confidence in its ultimate control over its
children is the practice of rumspringa, a traditional "running around"
period allotted to youngsters.1 3 6 At about the age of eighteen, Amish
youngsters are permitted, if they wish, to go off and do anything they
like. Because the Amish are Anabaptists who believe in adult baptism,' 3 7
these youngsters are not yet baptized, and therefore, technically, their
sins somehow do not "count." Rumspringa can be imagined as a time to
sew wild oats before taking on the heavy responsibilities baptism
imposes on the Amish.
Rumspringa can last as long as a youngster likes, postponing
baptism indefinitely. Many Amish youngsters prefer to stay home under
the supervision of their parents, and at most may attend a dance or party,
or an overnight visit to a friend. These youngsters submit to baptism
eagerly. Many others go off in groups, interesting themselves in
fornication, alcohol, and narcotics. 13 8
Looked at functionally, rumspringa is the ultimate demonstration to
the children that they are substantially unable to leave the community,
that for them there is no such thing as freedom. There is little room for
these undereducated waifs in modem society. Such employment as they
can find outside their community, even in good times, does not often
improve on the labor awaiting them at home. Although statistics vary
133. See Greenhouse,supra note 121.
134. See, e.g., RUTH IRENE GARRETT & RICK FARRANT, CROSSING OVER: ONE WOMAN'S
ESCAPE FROM AMISH LIFE (2003).
135.See generally JOHN A. HOSTETLER, AMISH CHILDREN: EDUCATION
SCHOOL, AND COMMUNITY (2d ed. 1992).

IN THE FAMILY,

136.See, e.g., TOM SHACHTMAN, RUMSPRINGA: TO BE OR NOT TO BE AMISH (2006);
"Rumspringa: Amish Teens Venture into Modem Vices," NPR (June 7, 2006), http://www.npr.org/
templates/story/story.php?storyld=5455572 (reviewing Shachtman's book).
137.1DONALD B. KRAYBILL, WHO ARE THE ANABAPTISTS: AMISH, BRETHREN, HUTTERITES,
AND MENNONITES (2003).
138. See, e.g., DVD: Devil's Playground (Stick Figure Productions 2002).
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widely, it appears that Chief Justice Burger's observation remains more
true than he knew: There is very little attrition among the Amish.
With all this, we finally have the key to the McReynolds mystery.
These cases, Meyer, Pierce, and Yoder, need to be understood against the
background of the relation between compulsory school laws and child
labor. The use of compulsory school laws to regulate child labor is
centuries old.1 39 In England, employed children at first were exempt from
judicial
and
legislative
suggesting
schooling,
compulsory
accommodation of common family expectations.14 0 But as compulsory
school laws have evolved, their main purpose seems thereafter to have
been to protect children from exploitation.
Of course compulsory schooling also promotes literacy and
enhances the value of an adult's labor. It also preserves employment for
adults, by keeping cheaper underage workers at school.14' This concern
for adult labor, in our country, at least, probably has some roots in the
"free labor" political movement of the antebellum period, which was also
both anti-immigrant and anti-slavery out of similar concern for the free
American worker.
VI. THE MCREYNOLDS MYSTERY SOLVED
This revelation about the Old Amish casts a long shadow back upon
Yoder, Pierce, and Meyer itself. With this broader understanding, and in
possession of the fact of child labor among the Old Amish, we can begin
to see the dark side of these cases. We can begin to understand that
Justice McReynolds' celebrated school cases were explainable by his
laissez-faire politics.
The striking down of laws compelling attendance in public schools,
the permission to parents to home-school their children, the disapproval
of English-only teaching following upon a veritable flood of
immigration, all served the interests of those who might wish to exploit
child labor. McReynolds understood the value to employers of helping
distressed families sell their children's labor. He understood the value to
employers of permitting parents to deny their children the education
which might offer them escape in later life from the sweat shops and
139.FOREST CHESTER ENSIGN, COMPULSORY SCHOOL ATTENDANCE AND CHILD LABOR: A
STUDY OF THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF REGULATIONS COMPELLING ATTENDANCE AND
LIMITING THE LABOR OF CHILDREN IN A SELECTED GROUP OF STATES 3 (1921).
140.See 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 434-447 (1765);
COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 189-203 (2d ed. 1832) (1827).

2

JAMES KENT,

141.See MARIS M. PROFFIT & DAVID SEGEL, U.S. OFFICE OF EDUC., SCHOOL CENSUS,
COMPULSORY EDUCATION, CHILD LABOR: STATE LAWS AND REGULATIONS (1945); RAYMOND
GARFIELD FULLER, THE MEANING OF CHILD LABOR (1922); EDITH ABBOT & SOPHONISBA P.
BRECKINRIDGE, TRUANCY AND NON-ATTENDANCE IN THE CHICAGO SCHOOLS: A STUDY OF THE
SOCIAL ASPECTS OF THE COMPULSORY EDUCATION AND CHILD LABOR LEGISLATION OF ILLINOIS
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factories of that period. McReynolds' effort, in this view, had been to
loosen the web of progressive-era legislation that sought to protect a
childfrom its parents.
McReynolds, that most reactionary of judges, might well have
thought that immigrant parents ought to have the "liberty" of diminishing
their children's opportunity to obtain a secular public education in the
English language. Those children, at once or later, could furnish a cheap,
submissive, and trapped pool of workers. Meyer identified and advanced
the parental authority, as against the state, that in Pierce, empowered the
parent to pull a child out of public school, and, in Yoder, to provide the
child with only minimal reading, writing, and arithmetic while forcing
the child into work. McReynolds might well have thought that parents
ought to have the "liberty" of pulling their children out of school and
putting them out to work. Chief Justice Burger did not see Yoder in this
stark light, but McReynolds in Meyer and Pierce would have been
writing against the background of his political and economic views,
disclosed to us in his career as one of the Four Horsemen, and by his
known convictions.
Of course McReynolds would liken the goal of assimilation, in no
way inconsistent with individualism, to the grotesque forced uniformity
advocated by Plato. From McReynolds' point of view, I suppose, the
urchin offspring of loathed immigrants had no place in mainstream
American life. They belonged in the factories, contributing to their
parents' support, and saving entrepreneurs the expense of employing
their fathers. Justice McReynolds certainly would not have wanted those
hordes in the public schools, consuming public resources at taxpayers'

expense.142
That McReynolds favored child labor is not in doubt. One has only
to consult his votes in the child labor cases. In 1918, he voted with the
five-to-four majority in Hammer v. Dagenhart,14 3 denying Congress
power to bar the products of child labor from interstate commerce.144 In
142. It is sometimes reported that McReynolds' will made considerable bequests to children's
charities, or that he contributed to children's charities all his life. E.g., BOND, supra note 49, at 5.
What are we to make of this? We do have an abbreviated statement purporting to be a description of
McReynolds' will filed in a probate court in the District of Columbia. Gilbert, supra note 63, at 2325. The will serves as an inadvertent revelation of McReynolds' personal isolation. It included a
cash bequest of $10,000 to a children's hospital. There was also a $10,000 bequest to a college in
Kentucky, to be used for the "instruction of girls in domestic affairs." The bulk of McReynolds'
money (he left $190,000) went to his servants, various colleges, universities, schools and hospitals
(the latter institutions possibly including children's charities). The largest single bequest, $25,000,
went to McReynolds' church. There were modest gifts to two women friends, and $10,000 to his
brother. There was also a bequest of $2500 to the mother of "lovely triplet girls." The bequest to a
children's hospital (and such bequests to similar charities as may exist among the other institutional
bequests) are consistent, at least, with McReynolds' view that the burden of supporting needy
children should not fall on the state and thus the taxpayer.

143.247 U.S. 251 (1918).
144.Id. at 277.
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1922, only a year before Meyer, he voted to strike down the Child Labor
Tax Law as beyond the power of Congress. 145 In the same year as Meyer
he voted with the Court to strike down a state minimum wage law for
women and children. 14 6 And in 1937, in alliance with the other three
"Horsemen," he dissented from the majority opinion in the watershed
47
That case finally sustained a
case of West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish.1
state minimum wage law for women and children, and marked the year
of change after which the Supreme Court began to defer more regularly
to reasonable legislation.
Meyer's progeny, cases expansively building on Meyer's due
process liberty, may explain if not excuse the blindness of so many
writers on constitutional law, for so long, to Meyer's dark side.14 8 Our
current casebooks and treatises on constitutional law pay only cursory
attention to Meyer and Pierce, and say little or nothing about the relation
of compulsory education to the problem of child labor. It is true that, in
commenting on Yoder, writers do see a troubling permission to some
parents to reduce a child's education to the barest essentials. 4 9 But they
seem unwilling to open their eyes to the same sort of problem in Meyer
and Pierce. They fail to perceive, as Chief Justice Burger failed to
perceive, a hidden motive spring in Yoder - the incentives parents have
to require their children to serve them in the home, help support the
family, and to deny their children, as a practical matter, the power of
escape. Yet the parental interest in such exploitation has hardly been
unknown to the common law - historically, the common law facilitated
it.150
We can now see the connection between Justice McReynolds'
economic worldview and his opinion in Meyer.'5 1 We can now read into
Meyer McReynolds' conviction that law should not obstruct the efforts
of needy families to augment their incomes by putting their children out
to work. We can now see, in turn, that the facilitation of the exploitation
145. Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co. (Child Labor Tax Case), 259 U.S. 20,44 (1922).
146 Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923).(Sutherland, J.) (over strong dissents
by Chief Justice Taft, joined by Justice Sanford, and Justice Holmes) Justice Brandeis did not
participate.
147.300 U.S. 379 (1937).
148.1 am finding partly corroborative work, however, in the field of family law. See, e.g.,
Steven J. Macias, The Huck Finn Syndrome in History and Theory: The Origins of Family Privacy,
12 J. L. & FAM. STUD. 87, 90-91 (2010) (building on Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, "Who Owns the
Child?": Meyer and Pierce and the Child as Property, 33 WM. & MARY L. REv. 995 (1992)). But
see infra "Envoi" for my ultimate disagreement with this school of thought.
149. See, e.g., Emily Buss, The Adolescent's Stake in the Allocation of Educational Control
Between Parentand State, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 1233, 1244-45 (2000).
150. See supranote 140 and accompanying text.
151. For the view that Meyer reinforced class inequalities, see Martha Minow, Confronting the
Seduction of Choice: Law, Education, and American Pluralism, 120 YALE L. J. 814, 820 (2011)
("[Meyer's] rhetoric of choice . .. obscured inequality in economic resources that made the option of
private schools available to some and not to others . . . .").
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of labor is the link between Meyer and Lochner. It is only necessary to
recall that, in Lochner, the Court struck down a state law regulating the
hours of labor.
ENvol
While acknowledging this unhappy side of Meyer, we can still
appreciate, even in the face of continuing controversy, the importance of
what Meyer has wrought.
From the perspective of those concerned with children's rights, the
right to family privacy will seem a screen behind which the child is
abused and exploited. In this view, the right to privacy in Roe v. Wade
can be seen as stripping away the legal protections, as against their own
parents, of the unborn, just as Meyer and Pierce and Yoder analogously
strip away the legal protections, as against their own parents, of the born.
But from another perspective, the modern right to privacy has
liberated, and continues to liberate, women and men from government
intrusion upon and punishment for their most intimate acts and feelings.
If we accord due weight to the suffering and desperation of those thus
interfered with and punished, and the still pervasive social and religious
hostility to them, we ought to prefer to see children's rights and adults'
rights together, as part of the "rational continuum"'1 52 of constitutional
liberty.
Meyer's greatness lies in its progeny - cases creating a sphere of
family and domestic privacy, and within that sphere, at last securing the
liberties essential to it. All this considered, these developments, however
unsettling, when viewed in their progressive character, must be counted
as great advances in human freedom.

152.Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 543 (1961) (Harlan, J., concurring).

